Abstract-Data privacy is one of the key challenges faced by enterprises today. Anonymization techniques address this problem by sanitizing sensitive data such that individual privacy is preserved while allowing enterprises to maintain and share sensitive data. However, existing work on this problem make inherent assumptions about the data that are impractical in day-to-day enterprise data management scenarios. Further, application of existing anonymization schemes on enterprise data could lead to adversarial attacks in which an intruder could use information fusion techniques to inflict a privacy breach. In this paper, we shed light on the shortcomings of current anonymization schemes in the context of enterprise data. We define and experimentally demonstrate Web-based Information-Fusion Attack on anonymized enterprise data. We formulate the problem of finding a Fusion Resilient Enterprise Data Anonymization and propose a prototype solution to address this problem.
I. INTRODUCTION
Enterprises manage sensitive individual-specific information such as customer data, employee records etc on a daily basis. Data privacy in this context is of great importance. Several instances of data privacy breaches in the recent past have resulted in financial as well as reputation losses for enterprises. Anonymization techniques address this problem by sanitizing sensitive data such that individual privacy is preserved while allowing enterprises to maintain and share sensitive data. Recent work on data anonymization techniques [1] [2] [3] break individual-specific data into three classes of attributes : Identifier Attributes, Quasi Identifier Attributes and Sensitive Attributes. Based on this, existing solutions assume that the Identifier Attributes are stripped prior to the anonymization process. (The reader is referred to the full version of this paper for a comprehensive explanation [4] ). We believe that this assumption is too restrictive and is even impossible in some scenarios where the presence of explicit identifiers is necessary for the intended purpose of the anonymized release. Consider the following scenario: Enterprise Data -Example : Table I (a) depicts a customer database in a typical financial institution. The data contains identifier information (Customer Name(Name)) along with certain non-sensitive attributes (Investment Volume Index (Invst Vol), Investment Amount Index (Invst Amt), Customer Valuation (Valuation)) and certain sensitive information (Customer Personal Income (Income)). The internal release of such data with explicit identifiers (Customer Names) is a necessity for several within-enterprise operations such as accounting, record keeping etc. Note that trivial solutions such as the use of pseudonyms are not viable in such scenarios. However, at the same time, such a release should not compromise the privacy (and hence the disclosure) of sensitive information (Customer Personal Income). The key property here is: Attribute disclosure needs to be prevented even with the possibility of Identity disclosure.
In the enterprise database scenario described above, anonymizing data using existing techniques falls short in providing adequate protection against adversarial attacks. Web-Based Information-Fusion Attack : Table I(b) shows the anonymized version of the enterprise data example in Table I (a) using K-anonymity [1] . The non-sensitive attributes have been anonymized to prevent sensitive attribute disclosure. Table I(b) is now deemed safe and is released internally within the enterprise. Consider the possibility in which an adversary (possibly an insider) who is given (or otherwise acquires) access to the anonymized release. The adversary's goal is to use the anonymized release to estimate the customer personal income values. To achieve this, he uses the customer names present in the release to search for additional information about the customers from other sources such as the web. Abundant individual-specific information is available on the web through homepages, blogs, personals etc. The adversary then uses his understanding of the data and fuses the anonymized release and web-based auxiliary information to estimate the sensitive data. This could be achieved either by a human-in-the-loop or automated information fusion techniques.
In this paper, we demonstrate the shortcomings of existing anonymization schemes when applied to enterprise data through the Web-Based Information-Fusion Attack. We formulate the problem of finding a Fusion Resilient Enterprise Data Anonymization and propose a prototype solution to address this problem.
A. Related Work
Breaching data privacy using auxiliary information has recently received a lot of attention in the research community. Martin et al. [2] and Chen et al. [3] propose a language for expressing the adversary's knowledge based on conjunctive propositions. More recently, Narayanan et al. [5] demonstrate a variant of such attack on Netflix data using information from another website. Our work is critically different from these studies as we consider data disclosure (more precisely attribute disclosure) based on Information Fusion using explicit identifying information present in the anonymized release.
II. WEB-BASED INFORMATION-FUSION ATTACK

A. Information Fusion
In our work, we use fuzzy inferencing to build an Information Fusion system. Fuzzy Inferencing is a well-studied mechanism [6] to map a set of inputs to a set of outputs using a set of rules. We refer the reader to [6] for an introduction to fuzzy inference systems. Figure 2 (a) illustrates the fuzzy inferencing system we use in this paper. Section 3 provides the details on the experimental attack we carry out.
B. Problem Formulation
We now formulate the problem of finding a Fusion Resilient Enterprise Data Anonymization to address web-based information-fusion attacks. Since it is not practical to quantify the amount of auxiliary information the adversary can collect, in our formulation, we estimate the auxiliary data that an adversary could collect and attempt to minimize the extent of privacy breach in case of an attack. On the other hand, one of the important factors involved in data anonymization is to maximize the utility of the release [7] . Hence, the secondary goal of our problem formulation is to maximize data utility. With these goals in hand, we proceed to formulate the overall goal as follows:
Let P = {p ij } m×n be a sensitive private dataset defined over a finite set of attributes {P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n }. Let Q = {q ij } r×s be the auxiliary data gathered by the intruder from the web over a set of attributes {Q 1 , Q 2 , . . . , Q s }. Now, let P be a candidate anonymization of P . Let F be an information fusion system that takes in P and Q as inputs and produceŝ P , an estimate of P . Let U be a measure of utility of P .
Goal : The goal of Fusion Resilient Enterprise Data
Anonymization is to compute a P from P such that: 1) P is resilient to Web-based Information Fusion Attacks.
2) The utility U offered by P meets the release requirements. To formulate the problem based on the above goal, we need to quantify the resilience to web-based information-fusion attacks. We define this using the following definitions: 
where m is the total number of records in each database and T r(A) of a matrix A is the trace of A, i.e the sum of the elements of the main diagonal.
LetP be an estimate of P made by the adversary based on a candidate release P and web-based auxiliary data Q using the information fusion system F ,P = F (P , Q). Now, the dissimilarity between P andP (P •P ) quantifies the protection offered by the corresponding P against information fusion attacks. In order for privacy of P to be protected, the dissimilarity between P andP , needs to be above a threshold value. Based on this, we now define a Fusion Resilient Anonymization as: Definition 2 Fusion Resilient Anonymization An anonymization P of a given sensitive data P is resilient to fusion attacks if the dissimilarity (P •P ) betweenP and P is above a certain threshold value T p .
So, for a candidate anonymization P to be a safe release, the corresponding (P •P ) needs to satisfy the above property. It is obvious to note that, among all the possible anonymizations (P s) that satisfy this property, the one that has maximum value of (P •P ) offers maximum resilience to web-based information fusion attacks. Let W 1 and W 2 be the weights assigned by the publisher for privacy protection against information fusion attacks and data utility respectively. Now, the objective is to maximize the weighted sum of protection and utility of the form: W 1 * (P •P ) + W 2 * U . In order to solve the above optimization problem, we need to find the optimal anonymization P in the solution space containing all possible anonymizations P s that satisfy the fusion-resilient-anonymization property. One way to look at this solution space is to consider the set of all anonymizations possible by anonymizing P to different levels. Note that the definition of Anonymization Level depends on the specific anonymization scheme to be employed. For example, in Kanonymization, the value of k represents the anonymization level. The more the value of k is, the more the anonymization level. For a given dataset P , let i denote the anonymization level and P i denote the release obtained by anonymizing P to level i. We use the discernibility metric defined in [7] to measure the utility of a k-anonymized data set. Based on this, let the utility of P i be denoted by U i . The optimization function H can now be defined based on anonymization level i as:
Let T u be the minimum utility required for the release. Now, the above generic problem statement can be instantiated as: Problem Statement: Find P iopt , such that
where, (P •P i ) ≥ T p and U i ≥ T u .
C. Solution
Algorithm 1 presents this solution in procedural format as FRED Anonymization (Fusion Resilient Enterprise Data Anonymization). The strategy is to take any basic anonymization scheme such as k-anonymization and incrementally anonymize the data. The level of anonymization is increased in steps (increase k in steps), until the utility of the release falls below a threshold. In each step, the web-based fusion attack is simulated to find whether the resulting candidate anonymization offers enough protection. If yes, the candidate anonymization is retained, otherwise it is discarded. This results in a set of all candidate anonymizations present in the solution space. We then search for the optimal anonymization level that offers the maximum weighted sum of protection and utility.
III. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section we demonstrate the web-based informationfusion attack on a real-life dataset. The goals here are to quantify the Information Gain obtained by the adversary through the attack and demonstrate the FRED Anonymization algorithm. The sensitive data (P ) is collected from a real-life enterprise (a public university) and contains salary information and performance review numbers of the employees (faculty). The employee Salary is the sensitive attribute while the performance review numbers are the non-sensitive attributes. The data is anonymized (P ) so as to suppress all of the salary information and k-anonymize the non-sensitive attributes using microaggregation based k-anonymization proposed in [8] . The external data(Q) is collected from the employee web pages and external links from there. Based on domain knowledge, we formulate a simplistic set of knowledge rules to fuse P and Q and build a fuzzy inference system to estimate the employee salary as illustrated in Figure 2(a) . All the experiments were implemented using Matlab on a PC with Intel Pentium 4 (1.8GHz) processor and 1GB of RAM running Microsoft Windows XP. P level ← Basic Anonymization(P , level) 13:P level ← F (P level , Q) 14:
U level ← Utility(P level ) 16 :
end if 27: end for 28: return P i opt
A. Information Gain
Our first study aims to quantify the Information Gain obtained by the adversary through the attack. Consider the adversary's knowledge of the original data at two stages 1. Before the attack, and 2. After the attack. The adversary's (best) knowledge about the original data before the attack is the anonymized version itself, i.e P (in the absence of Q). In this case, we have the dissimilarity between the original and the adversary's estimate (P •P ) == (P • P ). Figure 1 (a) plots this (P •P ) for increasing values of k. After performing information fusion, the adversary obtainsP by fusing P with Q using F . Figure 1 (b) plots this (P •P ) for increasing values of k. Notice that the estimate made by the attacker (P ) after information fusion is closer to (P ) than when compared to the estimate available before information fusion (P ). The difference between (P •P ) and (P •P ) is precisely the amount of Information Gain G by the adversary through fusion. Figure 1 (c) plots G for increasing values of k. It is interesting to observe that G does not necessarily increase with k. The reason for this is that as the level of anonymization increases, the input (P ) to the information fusion system gets worse and thus forces the system to output incrementally bad estimates. 
B. Optimal Anonymization
We now study the fusion resilient enterprise data anonymization that leads to maximum weighted sum of protection and utility as formulated in Section 2. We use the discernibility metric defined in [7] to measure the utility of a k-anonymized data set. The basic idea here is to assign a cost to each data sample based on the size of the cluster it falls into. The reader is referred to the original paper for further details. Figure 2 (b) plots U k for increasing values of k. It is straight-forward to observe that utility of data decreases as k increases. Using this definition, we define the utility of the data set as a column matrix U = {u i1 } m×1 where each entry is the inverse of the cost assigned to the corresponding data point. The goal now is to find the optimal k value such that the resulting anonymization offers maximum weighted sum of privacy protection and utility formulated as:
We establish the threshold values for protection and utility as T p = 3.075, T u = 0.0018 based on experimental observations. For these threshold values, we obtain the solution space of k = 7 to 14. We assign equal weights to privacy protection and utility i.e W 1 = W 2 = 0.5. Based on this setup, Figure  2 (c) plots H for increasing values of k within the solution space. By running an optimization for the maximum value of H, we obtain the result k = 12. This is the optimal k value that provides the maximum weighted sum of protection and utility.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we shed light on the shortcomings of current anonymization schemes in the context of enterprise data. We defined the Web-Based Information-Fusion Attack wherein an adversary uses information fusion techniques to fuse anonymized data with publicly available information from the web to inflict a privacy breach. Our experimental demonstration of the attack present the practicality and easiness with which such attacks might lead to revelation of sensitive data. We formulate the problem of finding a fusion resilient data anonymization and propose one possible solution to address this problem.
